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STATE LAWS liMITING liABIliTY FOR NONECONOMIC 
DAMAGES: HOW COURTS HAVE DEALT WITH THE 
RELATED LEGAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES IN ASBESTOS 
PERSONAL INJURY CASES 
M. King Hill, mt 
Katherine D. Williamstt* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1980s, "more than three-fifths of the states enacted some 
form of tort reform legislation"l in response to a widely perceived 
insurance crisis and criticism among legal scholars that the tort sys-
tem had become ineffective.2 Two of the most widely adopted meth-
ods of reform involved placing limits on noneconomic damages and 
modifying joint and several liability.3 
The statutory limits, or caps, on noneconomic damages have 
varied widely among the states that have enacted them.4 Some states 
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1. Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of 
Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. 
REv. 628, 628 (1988). 
2. See id. These reforms included modifying joint and several liability, limiting 
noneconomic damages, "re-establishing many sovereign immunities, limiting 
liability for certain activities or actors," limiting the recovery of attorney's fees, 
imposing penalties for frivolous lawsuits, and encouraging alternative dispute 
resolution. Id. at 633-34. 
3. See id. at 633. 
4. See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort Com-
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impose noneconomic damages caps in tort cases generally;5 other 
states limit noneconomic damages, but only in medical malpractice 
cases;6 and other states impose noneconomic damages caps for 
other specific types of tort cases.? Several state statutes have been in-
pensation, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1567, 1567-68 (1997) ("Twenty-three states currently 
place statutory limitations on tort damages for pain and suffering: seven states 
cap damages in general tort cases; an additional sixteen states limit awards 
solely in medical malpractice cases. Several states also have provisions limiting 
damages in other, very specific types of tort cases." (footnotes omitted». 
5. See id. at 1567 & n.l (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010(b) (Michie 1996) 
($500,000 limit on noneconomic damages), COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-
102.5(3) (West 1989) ($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages unless the 
court finds justification through clear and convincing evidence, thereby in-
creasing the limit to $500,000), HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 663-8.7 (Michie 1995) 
($375,000 limit on damages for pain and suffering with certain classes of torts 
excepted), IDAHO CODE § 6-1603(1) (1990) ($400,000 cap on noneconomic 
damages), 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1(a) (West Supp. 1997) 
($500,000 limit on noneconomic damages), MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 11-108 (1995) ($500,000 limit on nonpunitive noneconomic damages), and 
OR REv. STAT. § 18.560(1) (1995) ($500,000 limit on noneconomic damages». 
6. See id. at 1567-68 & n.2 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West Supp. 1997) 
($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages), IND. CODE ANN. § 27-12-14-3(a) 
(West Supp. 1996) ($750,000 limit on total damages), and RAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-3407 (a) (1) (1994) ($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages), and com-
paring LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40: 1299.42(B)(1) (West 1992) ($500,000 limit on 
total damages), MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West Supp. 1997) 
($500,000 limit on total damages and $500,000 limit on noneconomic damages 
with exceptions allowed for special circumstances), MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. 
§ 600.1483 (West 1996) ($280,000 limit on noneconomic damages with excep-
tions), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.210(1) (West 1988) ($350,000 cap on 
noneconomic damages), NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2825(1) (1993) ($1,250,000 limit 
on total damages), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6(A) (Michie 1996) ($600,000 limit 
on total damages except for punitive damages and medical expenses), N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 32-42'{)2 (1996) ($500,000 limit on noneconomic damages), S.c. 
CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(a) (3)-(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996) ($1,000,000 limit on 
damages in claims against doctors employed by any government entity), S.D. 
CODIFIED LAws § 21-3-11 (Michie 1987) ($500,000 cap on noneconomic dam-
ages), UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1996) ($250,000 limit on nonpunitive, 
noneconomic damages), VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1992) 
($1,000,000 cap on total damages), W. VA. CODE § 55-78-8 (1994) ($1,000,000 
limit on noneconomic damages), and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(d) (West 
1997) ($350,000 cap on noneconomic damages». 
7. See id. at 1603 & n.3 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-44-113 (West Supp. 
1996) ($1,000,000 limit on total damages, $250,000 for noneconomic damages, 
in claims against ski areas), GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-6 (Supp. 1996) (no punitive 
damages in claims solely for emotional distress), RAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903(a) 
(Harrison 1994) ($100,000 limit on nonpecuniary damages in wrongful death 
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validated on state or federal constitutional grounds.8 Despite consti-
tutional issues, states continue to introduce legislation in an effort 
to place limits on noneconomic damage awards.9 
Maryland's cap statute, section 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article, Annotated Code of Maryland, was enacted in 
19~6 to respond to a perceived crisis in Maryland concerning the 
cost and availability of liability insurance. 1O Section 11-108 estab-
suits), MONT. CODE M'N. § 39-2-905(3) (1995) (no pain and suffering damages 
in wrongful discharge cases), and NY INS. LAw § 5104 (McKinney 1985) (no 
pain and suffering damages for negligent operation of an automobile if there 
is no serious injury». 
8. See id. at 1568 & n.4 (noting that in Alabama, Florida, New Hampshire, Ohio, 
Texas, and Washington, statutory damage limitation provisions have been 
struck down as unconstitutional). A statutory limitation on noneconomic dam-
ages was found to violate a plaintiff's right to due process where the court 
found that the plaintiff had a vested property right in a particular measure of 
damages and the statute as enacted denied recovery on an arbitrary basis. See, 
e.g., Peter A. Davis, The Constitutionality of Michigan s Medical Malpractice Dam-
ages Cap: Can it Survive Judicial Review?, 75 MICH. BJ 258, 258-62 (1996) (dis-
cussing Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Assoc., 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976) 
(holding that a medical malpractice noneconomic damage cap statute violated 
the plaintiff's due process rights as guaranteed by Illinois' state constitution) 
and Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (rejecting 
plaintiff's due process challenge to California's medical malpractice damages 
cap statute». A damage cap statute was found to violate a plaintiff's right to 
equal protection of the laws because it classified the limits imposed on claims 
in an unfair, arbitrary, and unreasonable manner. See id. at 262 (citing Carson 
v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980». In addition, a statutory limitation on 
noneconomic damages was found to violate a plaintiff's Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial to the extent that it required a judge to disregard the 
amount of jury award which exceeded the limit set forth in the statute. See id. 
(citing Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Assoc., 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991». 
9. See, e.g., 1997 N.Y A.B. 1930 (Personal Injury Action Noneconomic Damages) 
(introduced); 1997 S.C. H.B. 3023 (Enactment of Noneconomic Damages 
Awards Act 1997) (introduced). 
10. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 368, 601 A.2d 102, 114 (1992); Report of 
the Governors Task Force to Study Liability Insurance 3-4 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter 
Governors Task Force Report]; Report of Joint Executive/Legislative Task Force on Med-
ical Malpractice Insurance 5 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter Joint Task Force Report]; Di-
ana M. Schobel, Recent Development, The Application of the Cap on Noneconomic 
Damages to Wrongful Death Actions, 54 MD. L. REv. 914, 914 (1995) (citing 
United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 549, 620 A.2d 905, 913 (1993». State-
wide task forces formed to study the issue concluded that a noneconomic 
damages cap would lead to greater predictability of damage awards, making 
the insurance market more stable and thus more attractive to insurance un-
derwriters. The Governors Task Force Report noted that noneconomic damages 
are "impossible to ascertain with precision and are subject to emotional ap-
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lished a $350,000 limit on "any action for damages for personal in-
jury in which the cause of action arises on or after July 1, 1986."11 
Notwithstanding the statute's seemingly straightforward language, 
difficult issues of interpretation have arisen concerning its applica-
bility in product liability cases involving injuries arising out of latent 
diseases, specifically asbestos cases. 12 
The primary issue that Maryland courts have addressed, but 
failed to resolve with any workable test, is how to determine when a 
cause of action "arose" in determining whether the noneconomic 
damages cap is applicable to a case involving an asbestos-related, la-
tent diseaseY This is an issue in cases filed after July 1, 1986, the 
noneconomic damages cap statute's effective date, where exposure 
peals to a jury.» Governor's Task Force Report, supra at 11. It concluded that a 
$250,000 cap would "help contain awards within realistic limits.» Id. at 10. 
11. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (1997). A 1994 amendment in-
creased the cap to $500,000 for actions in which the cause of action arose on 
or after October 1, 1994. See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 34 n.6, 660 A.2d 
423,428 n.6 (1995). The 1994 amendment also expanded the cap to apply in 
wrongful death actions, in addition to personal injury actions. See Limitations 
on Noneconomic Damages Act, ch. 477, 1994 Md. Laws 2292 (codified as 
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (Supp. 1998». 
12. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. Six Maryland appellate cases have 
addressed the issue of whether Maryland's noneconomic damages cap statute 
applied to limit the plaintiff's noneconomic damage award. The court of ap-
peals addressed the issue in one case, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 
107, 124, 604 A.2d 47, 55 (1992) (holding that Maryland's noneconomic dam-
ages cap did not apply to limit the plaintiff's damage claim). The court of spe-
cial appeals has addressed the issue of whether the noneconomic damages cap 
applies to limit a plaintiff's noneconomic damages award in five cases: Porter 
Hayden Co. v. Brannan, No. 190 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. Mar. 10, 1998) (unpublished 
opinion), ACandS, Inc. v. Abate, 1998 WL 2803, at *49-50 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 
Jan. 7, 1998), Ford Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md. App. 1, 703 A.2d 1315 (1998), 
Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 692 A.2d 5 (1997), and 
Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 87 Md. App. 699, 591 A.2d 544 (1991), afj'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 326 Md. 107,604 A.2d 47 (1992). Two other cases are awaiting de-
cision by the court of special appeals: Owens Coming v. Bauman, No. 98-744 
(Md. Ct. Sp. App. filed Nov. 11, 1997) (notice of appeal), and Owens Coming 
v. Walatka, No. 98-385 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. filed Oct. 9, 1997) (notice of appeal). 
Defendant Ford has petitioned for certiorari in Grewe v. Ford Motor Co., one of 
the two consolidated cases decided by the court of special appeals in Ford Mo-
tor Co. v. Wood. The court of appeals has granted certiorari in Anchor Packing 
Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 692 A.2d 5, cert. granted, 346 Md. 373, 697 
A.2d 112 (1997), and Porter Hayden v. Bullinger, 346 Md. 373, 697 A.2d 112 
(1997). However, the court did not grant certiorari on the cap issue. 
13. See infra notes 22-24, 35-116 and accompanying text. 
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to the asbestos product occurred well in advance of that date. 14 
The determination of when a cause of action arose ultimately 
depends upon answering the question: When did the injury occur?15 
Plaintiffs generally argue that the injury occurred on the date of 
first exposure to the product. 16 Defendants maintain that no injury 
occurs until the plaintiff actually becomes ill-when the plaintiff ex-
periences symptoms of disease and incurs damages, such as medical 
expenses, pain and suffering, and lost wages. 17 
The problem lies not only in determining when the injury oc-
curred, but also in determining what the injury is. 18 In asbestos liti-
gation, this question is particularly difficult to answer in mesothe-
lioma cases,19 which involve an extremely long latency period 
consisting of a complex progression of cellular changes between ex-
posure to asbestos and the ultimate diagnosis of the disease.2o Un-
fortunately, the decisions to date by Maryland appellate courts have 
served only to complicate the issue.21 
Maryland courts have attempted to resolve the issue of when a 
cause of action arises in an asbestos case by holding that the cause 
of action arises when the injury-the disease-"comes into exis-
14. See infra notes 22-24, 35-116 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. This issue arises where a plaintiff 
does not experience symptoms and is not diagnosed prior to the effective date 
of the statute. The cap prevents plaintiffs from recovering more than $350,000 
in noneconomic damages when the cause of action arose after July 1, 1986. 
Consequently, plaintiffs seek to avoid the cap by contending that their injury 
occurred when their cancer developed-at some time before the statute's ef-
fective date-notwithstanding that they may not have experienced any symp-
toms until after the effective date. Defendants maintain that the cap should 
apply to limit a plaintiff's damages, arguing that a plaintiff cannot incur le-
gally compensable damages prior to the development of any symptoms, which 
occur in many cases after the cap's effective date, because of the long latency 
period. 
16. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 79, 92 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 70-79, 88-94 and accompanying text. 
19. See Scott S. Shepardson, Note, Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.: A 
Cruel Accrual Rule?, 32 U.S.F. L. Rev. 459, 463 (1998) ("Mesothelioma is a par-
ticularly aggressive form of cancer that is remarkable in that it is caused al-
most exclusively by exposure to asbestos."). 
20. See infra notes 95-96, 108-09 and accompanying text. 
21. See Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 120-21, 604 A.2d 47, 53-54 (1992) 
(holding that a cause of action arises when the injury comes into existence). In 
the context of a disease with a long latency period, this determination is diffi-
cult at best. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text. 
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tence."22 In the context of litigating a case involving a latent disease 
such as mesothelioma, this test requires extensive expert testimony.23 
Even with an expert opinion as to when a cancer began to develop, 
there remains the question of when the plaintiff's injury came into 
existence. Was it when the first cancerous cell formed, when a malig-
nant tumor formed, or when the tumor developed to the extent 
that the plaintiff experienced symptoms? Could a legally compensa-
ble injury occur prior to the plaintiff incurring damages such as 
medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering? Could a legally 
compensable i~ury occur before the plaintiff was even aware that 
he was injured? Who has the burden of proof as to these issues? 
When does an injury arise in the context of a loss of consortium 
claim? These questions are awaiting ultimate resolution in Maryland 
and will likely arise in other states which have enacted or may enact 
similar noneconomic damages cap statutes.24 
The California Supreme Court recently adopted a test that 
avoids the uncertainty inherent in the Maryland test and reduces 
the need for complex medical testimony. The California test pro-
vides that a cause of action for damages from a latent disease ac-
crues, for purposes of the cap statute, when the disease is diagnosed 
or the plaintiff discovers the illness or injury, whichever occurs 
first. 25 In adopting this test, the California Supreme Court rejected a 
qualified "appreciable harm" test, similar to Maryland's "legally 
compensable injury" test, declaring that the appreciable harm test 
bore "little or no relation to the considerations of fairness and pol-
icy" which guided the California court in its interpretation of the 
statute.26 To date, no other state has addressed the specific issue of 
22. Owens-Illinois, 326 Md. at 120-21, 604 A.2d at 53-54. 
23. See infra notes 95-116 and accompanying text. 
24. This issue may arise in latent disease cases in states enacting cap statutes 
which limit noneconomic damages awards generally and contain no express 
applicability provisions or which contain applicability provisions similar to Ma-
ryland's-one providing that the statute is applicable to causes of action "aris-
ing" or "accruing" after the statute's effective date. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. 
§ 09.17.010 (Michie 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (1989); IDAHO CODE 
§ 6-1603 (1987); 735 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 60-19a02 (1994); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2323.54 (Banks-Baldwin 1997). 
At least one state has avoided this issue by providing that the cap statute is ap-
plicable to causes of action filed on or after its effective date. See, e.g., MICH. 
CaMP. LAws § 600.2946a (1996). 
25. See Buttram v. Owens-C;orning Fiberglas Corp., 941 P.2d 71,80 (Cal. 1997). 
26. Id. at 83; if. Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y 
1995). In Consorti, the Court of Appeals of New York considered" 'whether a 
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when a cause of action arises for purposes of a noneconomic dam-
ages cap.27 
Part II of this Article reviews the development of Maryland law 
on the issue of when a cause of action arises and the closely related 
issue of what constitutes an injury in the application of Maryland's 
cause of action lies for loss of consortium where, prior to the marriage, the 
plaintiff's spouse was exposed to, and ingested, a substance that remained in 
his body and eventually caused illness, but the illness did not occur until after 
the marriage.''' Id. at 1301 (quoting Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
Corp., 45 F.3d 48,49 (2d Cir. 1995». In concluding that such a plaintiff would 
not have a cause of action, the court rejected a "fact-based date of medical in-
jury test" based on "practical and policy reasons . . . [including] the need to 
provide manufacturers, employers and other economic actors who are poten-
tial defendants with a degree of certainty or predictability in assessing the risk 
of liability and to avoid stale claims which often turn on questions of credibil-
ity or disputed medical judgments." Id. at 1302. The court reaffirmed a 
"bright line, readily verifiable rule ... in which, as a matter of law, the tor-
tious injury is deemed to have occurred upon the introduction of the toxic 
substance into the body." Id. The court did not distinguish between the injury 
to the person and the injury to the marital relationship. In a later case, the 
Court of Appeals of New York recognized that its bright line "exposure" rule 
was abrogated by statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R 214-c (McKinney 1986), which provides 
for a discovery rule in toxic tort cases. See Blanco v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 
689 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y 1997). 
27. Several courts have addressed the question of when a claim arises or accrues 
with regard to the applicability of statutes that established exclusive theories of 
liability in product liability actions after their effective dates. See, e.g., Brown v. 
RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524, 526-30 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
under Louisiana law, for purposes of application of the Louisiana Product Lia-
bility Act, a smoker's cause of action accrued not upon exposure, but upon in-
jury; affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant on pre-Act causes 
of action because the plaintiff, who was diagnosed after the Act's effective 
date, produced no evidence of injury prior to the effective date; holding doc-
tor's affidavit that there can be a 10 year latency period between exposure and 
development of cancer was insufficient to show the plaintiff suffered pre-Act 
damages); Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1063 (La. 1992) (holding 
that a cause of action accrues when plaintiff may bring a lawsuit; construing 
"events~ as meaning injury producing events-repeated or significant tortious 
exposurer-when the statute provided that it applied only to claims arising from 
events occurring after the effective date); see also Viereck v. Fibreboard Corp., 
915 P.2d 581, 584 (Wash. 1996) (holding that under the Washington Product 
Liability Act, the plaintiff's cause of action arose when injury producing event!Y-
exposure-occurred); if. Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 562 A.2d 
1100, 1107 (Conn. 1989) (holding that under Connecticut's general product 
liability statute, a cause of action accrued when plaintiff suffered actionable 
harm-when plaintiff (1) discovered or should have discovered he had been 
injured and (2) that defendant's conduct caused such injury). 
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noneconomic damages cap statute in asbestos cases.28 Part III dis-
cusses the evidentiary problems that arise when courts attempt to 
apply Maryland's legal test to these cases.29 Part III emphasizes the 
weakness of this test in that it requires courts to rely on expert testi-
mony to determine when an injury occurs, where the medical re-
search has not advanced sufficiently to provide a definitive scientific 
test.30 Part IV examines how courts assign the burden of proof in 
cases where application of the statutory limitation on damages is at 
issueY Part V addresses the effect of Maryland's noneconomic dam-
ages cap statute on loss of consortium claims.32 Finally, Part VI dis-
cusses a recent California case that sets forth a test which avoids 
many of the problems inherent in Maryland's approach.33 In conclu-
sion, this Article suggests that the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
should grant certiorari to clarifY many of the issues raised in this Ar-
ticle, and advocates adopting a test similar to California's.34 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF MARYLAND LAW 
During the 1980s, the insurance industry reacted to increasing 
losses by raising premiums and canceling or refusing to issue cer-
tain high-risk policies.35 As a result, Maryland experienced an insur-
ance crisis, evidenced by the unavailability of liability insurance for 
certain businesses, particularly those engaged in hazardous activities, 
and skyrocketing insurance premiums for doctors, particularly in 
high-risk specialties.36 In an effort to attract private insurers back to 
Maryland, provide affordable liability insurance, and ensure an ade-
quate supply of quality medical services in the state, the Maryland 
General Assembly enacted section 11-108 of the Maryland Code, 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 37 Section 11-108 provides 
that, in "any action for damages for personal injury in which the 
cause of action arises on or after July 1, 1986, an award for 
noneconomic damages may not exceed $350,000. "38 
28. See infra notes 35-116 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 11741 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 12441 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 142-63 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 164-76 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra notes 177-214 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 215-24 and accompanying text. 
35. See Manzer, supra note 1, at 629 & n.6. 
36. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
37. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 368-69, 601 A.2d 102, 115 (1992). 
38. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (1997). 
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Notwithstanding the statute's seemingly straightforward lan-
guage, its application to personal injury actions involving latent dis-
eases has proven to be problematic.39 Specifically, Maryland courts 
have failed to develop a clear test for determining when a plaintiffs 
cause of action arises to determine whether the cap should apply in 
an asbestos-related latent disease case.40 
A. Armstrong I 
In Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong (Armstrong 1) ,41 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland construed the meaning of the phrase 
"cause of action arises" in section 11-108. Plaintiff Armstrong, a 
shipyard worker, and three other workers brought product liability 
claims in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against manufactur-
ers, installers, and suppliers of asbestos-containing insulation, under 
theories of negligence and strict liability.42 The jury awarded Arm-
strong $730,000 in compensatory damages: $5,000 for future medi-
cal expenses and $725,000 for noneconomic damages.43 Defendants 
appealed, contending that the trial court erred in failing to reduce 
the noneconomic damages award pursuant to section 11-108.44 
Defendant Owens-lllinois45 argued that because Armstrong was first 
diagnosed with asbestosis in September 1987 (based on a medical 
examination from the previous May), more than a year after the 
section 11-108's effective date, his damage award was subject to the 
cap.46 The court of special appeals disagreed and affirmed the 
verdict.47 
The court of special appeals stated that a " 'cause of action 
arises' in negligence or strict liability when facts exist to support 
each element" of the claim.48 The court rejected Owens-Illinois's 
contention that a cause of action does not arise until it is "discov-
39. See infra notes 41-116 and accompanying text. 
40. See infra notes 41-116 and accompanying text. 
41. 87 Md. App. 699, 591 A.2d 544 (1991) [hereinafter Armstrong 1], afi'd in part, 
reu'd in part, 326 Md. 107,604 A.2d 47 (1992). 
42. See id. at 705, 591 A.2d at 547. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. at 707, 591 A.2d at 547. 
45. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 111,604 A.2d 47, 49 (1992) 
(noting that the second defendant, Eagle-Picher Industries' appeal was stayed 
because it filed a Title 11 bankruptcy petition, thereby leaving Owens-Illinois 
as the sole defendant seeking review of the judgments). 
46. See Armstrong 1, 87 Md. App. at. 724, 591 A.2d at 556. 
47. See id. 
48. [d. at 725, 591 A.2d at 556. 
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ered" by the plaintiff,49 holding that the term arises in section 11-
108 (b) does not carry the same meaning as the term "accrues."50 
The court noted that the discovery rule, which delays the running 
of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers or could rea-
sonably have discovered the nature and cause of the injury, did not 
alter the moment at which a cause of action was deemed to have 
arisen. 51 Therefore, the court concluded that the cause of action 
arose when the facts existed to support each element, but it did not 
accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations until discovery.52 
The Armstrong I court then reviewed the evidence and con-
cluded that Armstrong must have contracted asbestosis prior to July 
1, 1986.53 The court noted that Armstrong was diagnosed as having 
asbestosis in September 1987,54 and he was continuously exposed to 
asbestos between 1942 and 1963.55 Owens-Illinois's medical expert 
testified that asbestosis has a latency period-the period from expo-
sure to diagnosis-of fifteen to twenty years, but in circumstances of 
heavy exposure, it could be shorter. 56 Armstrong's medical expert 
put the latency period at twenty to thirty years, but stated that asbes-
tosis is present from the time the first fibers enter the lungsY The 
court concluded that even assuming the longest latency period of 
thirty years (from 1942 until 1972), by July 1, 1986, the disease 
would have had fourteen more years to develop than was required 
under normal exposure. 58 The court concluded that "[ i] t [was] incon-
ceivable that Armstrong's asbestosis came into existence between 
July 1, 1986 and his medical examination in May, 1987," and held 
that his damage award was not controlled by the cap. 59 Subse-
quently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted defendant 
Owens-Illinois's petition for certiorari and reviewed the court of spe-
cial appeals's decision in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong (Armstrong 
49. See id. 
50. See id. at 726, 591 A.2d at 557. 
51. See id. (discussing Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 
299, 305 (1978) (extending discovery rule to situations involving latent devel-
opment of disease». 
52. See id. at 726, 591 A.2d at 557. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. at 725, 591 A.2d at 556. 
55. See id. at 727, 591 A.2d at 557. 
56. See id. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. Id. at 727, 591 A.2d at 557. 
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II) .60 
B. Armstrong II 
In Armstrong IL the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the 
court of special appeals's holding that the cap was not applicable to 
plaintiff Armstrong's damages award.61 The Armstrong II court af-
firmed the court of special appeals's conclusion that the cause of 
action arose "when facts exist[ed] to support each element," and 
noted that, "[i]n a negligence claim, the fact of injury would seem-
ingly be the last element to come into existence. "62 The Armstrong II 
court concluded, therefore, that the cap applied only if Armstrong's 
" 'injury' came into existence on or after July 1, 1986."63 
The Armstrong II court acknowledged that, "[ u] nfortunately, 
identifying the time at which an asbestos-related injury came into 
existence is usually not a simple task."64 The court concluded, how-
ever, that it need not decide exactly when Armstrong contracted as-
bestosis because it was "inconceivable that Armstrong's asbestosis 
came into existence between July 1, 1986 and his medical examina-
tion in May 1987. "65 The court noted that, based on the expert testi-
mony, "it was reasonable to assume that Armstrong's asbestosis took 
approximately 20 years to develop. "66 Because Armstrong's exposure 
began in the early 1940s, the court found the most reasonable con-
clusion was that his asbestosis developed at least by the mid-1960s.67 
The court observed that even if the initial damage to Armstrong oc-
curred in 1963, the last year he worked in the shipyard, the disease 
ordinarily would have developed by 1983, and under unusual cir-
cumstances even earlier.68 Thus, the court found the "only reasona-
ble conclusion, even viewed in the light most favorable to Owens-
Illinois," was that Armstrong contracted asbestosis prior to the effec-
"tive date of the cap statute.69 
60. 326 Md. 107, 604 A.2d 47 (1992) [hereinafter Armstrong II]. 
61. See id. at 124, 604 A.2d at 55. 
62. Id. at 121, 604 A.2d at 54 ("The breach, duty, and causation elements natu-
rally precede the fact of injury."). 
63. Id. at 122, 604 A.2d at 54. 
64.Id. 
65. Id. at 123, 604 A.2d at 55. 
66. Id. at 124, 604 A.2d at 55. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. 
69. Id. 
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C. Legally Compensable Injury 
The Armstrong I opinion included a discussion of what is a le-
gally compensable injury.70 The court held that mere alteration of the 
pleura-the thin membrane which lines the chest wall and dia-
phragm-caused by asbestos inhalation did not constitute a legally 
compensable injury.71 The court noted evidence demonstrating that 
pleural plaques and pleural thickening-the respective terms for lo-
calized and widespread scarring resulting from asbestos inhalation-
altered the pleura, but did not cause any loss or detriment.72 
Owens-Illinois's experts testified that "pleural plaques and pleural 
thickening did not affect the human body, did not shorten life ex-
pectancy, did not cause complications or problems, did not cause 
pain, and could not be felt."73 Likewise, plaintiffs' experts testified 
that the two conditions had "no health significance and did not 
cause any pain, dysfunction, symptoms or problems. "74 
In holding that the mere alteration of the pleura was not a le-
gally compensable injury, the court noted that harm was one of the 
necessary elements of a cause of action in both negligence and 
strict liability.75 The court cited section 7 (2) of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, which defines harm as "the existence of loss or detri-
ment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from a cause. "76 The 
court then quoted comment "b" to section 7: " '[h]arm' implies a 
loss or detriment to a person, and not a mere change or alteration 
in some physical person, object or thing .... In so far as [sic] 
physical changes have a detrimental effect on a person, that person 
70. See Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 87 Md. App. 699, 734, 591 A2d 544, 560-61 
(1991) (discussing Wright v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 80 Md. App. 606, 
565 A2d 377 (1989) (holding a jury instruction that the medical condition of 
pleural plaques was not a compensable injury did not invade the province of 
the jury because the plaintiffs had offered no evidence of injuries suffered 
solely as a result of pleural plaques». The Armstrong I court noted that the 
Wright court rejected plaintiffs' argument that pleural scars were "noncon-
sen ted alterations" to their bodies and, thus, grounds for compensation. Id. at 
735, 591 A2d at 561. The Armstrong I court similarly rejected plaintiffs' broad 
definition of "bodily harm," adopting instead the Restatement (Second) of Torts's 
definition of "harm" as requiring a "loss or detriment," and not a "mere 
change or alteration" to a person. Id. at 734, 591 A2d at 561. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. Id. at 733, 591 A2d at 560. 
74. Id. 
75. See id. at 734, 591 A2d at 561. 
76. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) (1965». 
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suffers harm."77 
Mter Armstrong I and II were decided, litigants cited both cases 
as authority for diametrically opposing propositions. Plaintiffs 
claimed that both cases supported the conclusion that a cause of ac-
tion for damages resulting from an asbestos-related disease arises 
upon exposure to the defendant's product, because the injury be-
gins upon first inhalation.18 Defendants asserted that the Armstrong I 
and II cases made clear that a cause of action cannot arise until the 
plaintiff experiences some compensable harm that cannot occur un-
til the disease has resulted in "functional impairment," which can 
take place many years after exposure.79 
D. Grimshaw 
In April 1997, the court of special appeals again addressed the 
applicability of the noneconomic damages cap in Anchor Packing Co. 
v. Grimshaw,80 in which plaintiffs diagnosed with mesothelioma sued 
manufacturers of asbestos products.81 Defendants appealed from the 
trial court's ruling that the noneconomic damages cap did not ap-
ply to the claims.82 The court's ruling was based on expert testimony 
that the mesothelioma occurred prior to July 1, 1986, the effective 
date of the noneconomic damages cap statute.83 All four plaintiffs 
were diagnosed with mesothelioma; three in 1994 and one in 1993.84 
In Grimshaw, the court of special appeals concluded that it was 
clear from the court of appeals's opinion in Armstrong II that a 
cause of action for an asbestos-related disease arises before diagno-
sis.85 However, the Grimshaw court observed that because of the par-
ticular facts in Armstrong II, the court of appeals did not have to de-
77. [d. (quoting REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. b (1965}). 
78. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
79. See Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 159, 692 A.2d 5, 10 
(1997), cert. granted sub. nom., Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 346 Md. 373, 
697 A.2d 112 (1997); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Porter Hayden Co. 
v. Bullinger at 22 (1997) (No. 97-160). 
80. 115 Md. App. 134, 692 A.2d 5 (1997), cert. granted sub. nom., Porter Hayden 
Co. v. Bullinger, 346 Md. 373, 697 A.2d 112 (1997). 
81. See id. at 144, 692 A.2d at 10; see also Maryland Appeals Court Applies Statutory 
Cap to Asbestos Cases, Anchor Packing v. Grimshaw, DES LmG. REp. (Andrews) 
25710 (May 1997) (summarizing Grimshaw). 
82. See Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 149, 692 A.2d at 13. 
83. See id. at 165, 692 A.2d at 20. 
84. See id. at 14748, 692 A.2d at 12. 
85. See id. at 156, 692 A.2d at 16. 
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termine precisely when the injury came into existence.86 Thus, the 
Grimshaw court proceeded to address the more exacting task of de-
termining the precise date of injury. 
Plaintiffs contended that an injury "arises in an asbestos-related 
disease claim when an individual is first exposed to asbestos fibers 
causing cellular changes to begin."87 However, the court of special 
appeals reiterated its holding in Armstrong I, that to have a cause of 
action based on product liability or negligence, the plaintiff must 
produce evidence of a legally compensable injury.88 'The court also 
restated the requirement of harm, citing section 7 (2) of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts,89 which provides in comment "b" that 
" '[h]arm' implies a loss or detriment to a person, and not a mere 
change or alteration in some physical person, object or thing."90 
The Grimshaw court concluded that" [m]ere exposure to asbestos 
and cellular changes resulting from asbestos exposure, such as pleu-
ral plaques and thickening, alone is not a functional impairment or 
harm, and therefore, do not constitute a legally compensable in-
jury."91 But, the Grimshaw court also rejected defendants' assertion 
that the injury or harm does not arise until the symptoms of the 
disease become apparent, dismissing the argument that such an ap-
proach would be less speculative.92 
The court concluded that an asbestos-related injury occurs 
"when the inhalation of asbestos fibers causes a legally compensable 
harm. "93 Specifically, the Grimshaw court stated: "Harm results when 
the cellular changes develop into an injury or disease, such as asbes-
86. See id. The Armstrong II court determined, based on expert testimony and view-
ing the facts in a light most favorable to the defendant, that the plaintiffs' dis-
ease must have developed at least three years before the enactment of the 
statute. See id.; see also supra note 68-69 and accompanying text. 
87. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 156, 692 A.2d at 16. 
88. See id. at 158, 692 A.2d at 17. 
89. See id. 
90. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) cmt. b (1965». 
91. Id. at 159, 692 A.2d at 17. In a footnote, the Grimshaw court added: "[T]his is 
not to say that immediate harm cannot arise shortly after exposure to asbestos 
fibers .... '[T]he inhalation and retention of asbestos fibers may cause imme-
diate harm to the cells and tissues of the lung.' » Id. at 159 n.5, 692 A.2d at 17 
n.5 (quoting Armstrong II, 326 Md. 107, 123, 604 A.2d 47, 55 (1992) (quoting 
Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 324 Md. 44, 61, 595 A.2d 469, 477 
(1991») . 
92. See id. at 160, 692 A.2d at 18. 
93. Id. 
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tosis or cancer. "94 
The court then reviewed the expert testimony.95 At trial, two ex-
perts testified that mesothelioma typically exists ten years before di-
agnosis.96 One expert testified that cancer began, at the earliest, 
three years before diagnosis. 97 The court remarked that 
"[u]nfortunately we are without the benefit of the trial court's rea-
soning in denying appellants' motion to apply the statutory cap to 
noneconomic damages. "98 The court concluded, therefore, that it 
had to assume that the trial court denied the defendants' motion to 
apply the cap based on the expert testimony that the mesothelioma 
94. Id. 
95. See id. at 164, 692 A.2d. at 20. The court observed: 
Id. 
The expert witnesses testified that, generally, mesothelioma be-
gins to grow ten years prior to diagnosis. The time between develop-
ment of cancer and diagnosis, however, could be anywhere from five 
to ten years. One expert testified that the cancer began, at the earli-
est, three years prior to diagnosis. At trial, an expert witness for the 
plaintiffs, Dr. Mark, a pathologist, testified ... that every exposure 
that occurs prior to the tumor becoming malignant contributes to 
the development of the tumor. Dr. Mark further stated that typically 
the interval between the tumor starting and the diagnosis of 
mesothelioma is between six months and three years. 
Dr.' Gabrielson testified on direct that "probably sometime 
around ten years before that cancer was recognized by the doctors, 
there was a tiny little cancer growing." Dr. Gabrielson also stated that 
the latency period for mesothelioma, the time from initial exposure 
to the time of diagnosis of the disease, ranges anywhere from eigh-
teen to fifty years. Later, on cross-examination, defendants' attorney 
asked Dr. Gabrielson about his testimony concerning the latency p~­
riod prior to the diagnosis of mesothelioma. Dr. Gabrielson stated 
that "the time that [sic] cell has produced a clinically recognized tu-
mor is on the order of five to ten years, probably more likely ten 
years ... I don't think there is any absolute measure of that. 
Similarly, Dr. Roggli testified that "it takes on average approxi-
mately 10 years for the tumor to become diagnosable clinically from 
the time it starts growing its individual cancer cell." Dr. Roggli fur-
ther explained that sarcomatoid tumors, which Grimshaw had, grew 
at a faster rate than biphasic variants of a mesothelioma, and begin 
growing sometime within five years prior to diagnosis. He further 
stated that epithelial cell-type mesothelioma ... begin to grow some-
time within ten years prior to diagnosis. 
96. See supra note 95. 
97. See supra note 95. 
98. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 165, 692 A.2d at 20. 
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developed before July 1, 1986.99 The court of special appeals noted 
that, although there was some medical testimony to the contrary, "it 
was up to the trial court, as the trier of fact on that issue, to weigh 
the evidence and reach a final determination."loo 
The Grimshaw court held, based on the expert testimony,101 that 
the record supported a finding that plaintiffs developed cancer, and 
that their causes of action arose, at least eight years prior to diagno-
sis in 1994 (three plaintiffs) and seven years prior to diagnosis in 
1993 (one plaintiff), and thus their causes of action arose before 
July 1, 1986, the statute's effective date. 102 Therefore, the court of 
special appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. 103 
In Grimshaw, the court of special appeals, while purporting to 
set forth a clear test for determining when an asbestos-related injury 
occurs, merely confused the issue, as is illustrated by its holding. I04 
The Grimshaw court held "that an injury occurs in an asbestos-
related injury case when the inhalation of asbestos fibers causes a 
legally compensable harm. Harm results when the cellular changes 
develop into an injury or disease, such as asbestosis or cancer."105 
The first sentence appears to be clear: that an injury occurs 
when the inhalation of asbestos fibers causes legally compensable 
harm. Legally compensable harm would seemingly be such harm 
that would form a basis for recovery by a plaintiff, such as medical 
expenses, pain and suffering, lost wages, and loss of consortium. 
However, the second sentence arguably means that a person who 
has developed a cancerous cell has sustained legally compensable 
harm, notwithstanding the fact that he has sustained no functional 
impairment or loss-no medical expenses, pain and suffering, or 
lost wages. 106 
99. See id. 
100. Id. 
101. See supra note 95. 
102. See Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 165, 692 A.2d at 20-21. 
103. See id. at 165, 692 A.2d at 21. Defendants filed petitions for certiorari and the 
court of appeals granted certiorari on July 30, 1997, in Porter Hayden Co. v. Bul-
linger, 346 Md. 373, 697 A.2d 112 (1997), but specifically declined to take certi-
orari on the noneconomic damages cap issue. 
104. See Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 160, 692 A.2d at 18. 
105. Id. 
106. Apparently, the court of special appeals equates the development of the first 
cancerous pleural cell with the development of mesothelioma. The court of 
appeals, however, has stated that mesothelioma is "the occurrence of malig-
nant tumors in the pleura." Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 
Md. 500, 506 n.2, 682 A.2d 1143, 1146 n.2 (1996). Because it is an undisputed 
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Under the Grimshaw test, a plaintiff would conceivably be 
deemed to have suffered legally compensable harm at the time his 
injury is so undeveloped as to be undiagnosable, and may never ac-
tually develop into a legally compensable harm.107 Thus, under the 
Grimshaw analysis, a plaintiff who developed a cancerous cell in 1980 
and remained symptom-free until he died accidentally in 1995 
would have had a cause of action for asbestos-related injuries, even 
though he had experienced no functional impairment or other 
compensable damages. lOS 
medical fact that not every cancerous cell ultimately becomes part of a tumor, 
the position taken by the court of special appeals is not scientifically sup-
ported. 
107. In order to state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must demon-
strate that he suffered legally compensable injuries. See Faya v. Almaraz, 329 
Md. 435, 448, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (1993) (recognizing a compensable injury for 
fear of acquiring AIDS from a surgeon); see also Metro-North Commuter RR 
v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,117 S. Ct. 2113, 2115,138 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1997) (inter-
preting "injury" compensable under FELA; an individual does not suffer a 
compensable injury "unless, and until he manifests symptoms of a disease"); 
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(" [S] ubc1inical injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is insufficient to 
constitute the actual loss or damage ... required to sustain a cause of action 
under generally applicable principles of tort law."); In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos 
Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (D. Haw. 1990) ("Plaintiffs must show a com-
pensable harm by adducing objective testimony of a functional impairment due 
to asbestos exposure.") (emphasis in original). 
108. In January 1998, the court of special appeals decided two asbestos cases, Ford 
Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md. App. 1, 703 A.2d 1315 (1998) and ACandS, Inc. v. 
Abate, 1998 WL 2803 (Md. Ct. Sp. App.Jan. 7,1998). In Ford, the plaintiff, who 
died of mesothelioma, worked from 1948 to 1952 in a garage and was alleg-
edly exposed to asbestos dust created by mechanics working in an adjacent 
area on automotive parts containing asbestos. See Ford, 119 Md. App. at 10, 703 
A.2d at 1319. The pl<iintiff's estate and survivors sued Ford, the manufacturer 
of the asbestos-containing parts. See id. at 9, 703 A.2d at 1318. The plaintiff be-
gan experiencing symptoms in 1992 and was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 
1993. See id. at 46, 703 A.2d at 1337. Ford urged the court to find that the 
plaintiff's cause of action arose when he began experiencing symptoms. Ford 
argued that the cap statute required the determination of an exact date the 
cause of action arose, which could only be determined precisely by looking at 
when the first symptom or diagnosis occurred. See id. Ford urged that Ann-
strong II was distinguishable because the medical evidence in that case indi-
cated that the plaintiff developed asbestosis at least by the mid-60s, and be-
cause it was inconceivable that the asbestosis came into existence between the 
cap's effective date in 1986 and the date of diagnosis in 1987. See id. at 4647, 
703 A.2d at 1337. Ford argued that as the date of manifestation of the disease 
approached the statute's effective date, it was more important to determine 
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It is speculative for a court to determine that a cause of action 
exists at the time the first cancer cell forms. Tumors develop as a 
result of a complex progression of cellular changes and unpredict-
able growth; therefore, a determination at the time of formation of 
the first cancer cell as to the existence of a cause of action would 
be impossibly speculative. 109 Even with the benefit of hindsight, such 
a determination is no less speculative. It is impossible to determine 
when the injury, and, thus, the cause of action, first existed because 
of the latent nature of the injury, and the fact that medical science 
has not developed adequate methods of measuring its growth. llD 
Based on the court's analysis in Grimshaw, however, all that may be 
necessary to show that such injury or legally compensable harm existed 
before the effective date of the cap statute is expert testimony 
which seemingly does no more than conclude that the injury could 
the exact date the injury occurred. See id. The court rejected Ford's argument 
that the Grimshaw test was too speculative. See id. at 48-49, 703 A.2d at 1338. 
The court noted that the plaintiff's medical expert had testified that "his can-
cer likely began to develop at least ten years prior to the date of diagnosis." 
Id. As the plaintiff was diagnosed in 1993, the court concluded that such evi-
dence was sufficient to support a finding that his injury occurred prior to the 
effective date of the cap statute. See id. at 48, 703 A.2d at 1338. It concluded 
that, "[ u] nder Grimshaw, we will uphold a trial court's determination of when 
an injury arises as long as that determination is supported by legally sufficient 
evidence." Id. Ford has petitioned for certiorari to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland. In contrast to Ford, in ACandS, Inc. v. Abate, the court of special ap-
peals applied the cap statute to a case involving a plaintiff diagnosed in 1992 
with pleural plaques and held that the plaintiff's cause of action could not 
have arisen until 1990, when he first experienced functional impairment as a 
result of that condition. See Abate, 1998 WL 2803, at *50. The plaintiff's expo-
sure to asbestos began in 1950, and a medical expert testified that pleural dis-
ease normally occurred between ten and fifteen years after first exposure; 
thus, it could have manifested itself as early as 1960. See id. However, because 
the plaintiff experienced no functional impairment until 1990, the court con-
cluded that his cause of action did not arise until that time. See id. Accord-
ingly, the court held that the noneconomic damages cap was applicable. See 
id. These two seemingly inconsistent opinions, decided just one day apart, fail 
to clarify Maryland law in this area. 
109. See, e.g., Official Trial Transcript, Brannan v. ACandS, Consolidated Case No. 
9535270, Indiv. Case No. 92153501 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City) (expert testi-
mony). Dr. Brody testified that bodily defense mechanisms can clear away in-
jured cells before they grow into tumors. See id. at T.662-63. Dr. Gabrielson fur-
ther testified that all cancers have "multiple mutation, multiple chromosomal 
aberrations," and that such changes occur over many years. "[ 0] nly after 
there is the right combination is the cell fully cancerous." Id. at T.2318. 
110. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. 
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have occurred prior to that date. III 
The following expert testimony formed the basis, in part, for 
the Grimshaw trial court's determination that the plaintiffs' i~uries 
occurred prior to 1986: 
Q. Doctor, you testified ... about 10 years between the 
manifestation or diagnosis of mesothelioma and when it be-
gan to grow, do you remember that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And isn't it true that it is your opmIOn that most 
likely the period of growth for mesothelioma tumor is on 
the order of five years? 
A. The time that one cell has all of the genetic 
changes, all of the chromosomal changes until the time 
that that cell has produced a clinically recognized tumor is 
on the order of five to ten years, probably more like ten 
years .... 
Maybe the tumor didn't develop until seven or eight 
years before the clinical recognition, maybe five years. 
Q. I [have] got your deposition taken in this case .... 
The question was put to you, "Do you have an opinion as 
to how long Mr. Grimshaw had this tumor before it was 
diagnosed?" 
And your answer was, "It is my opinion that the tumor 
existed in some form probably on the order of five years 
prior to diagnosis." 
Was that part of your answer? And then you can see 
the rest of it. 
A. Then I rambled on probably on the order of five 
years perhaps longer, perhaps ten years. Nobody knows for 
sure. 1I2 
Predictably, in the wake of the Grimshaw case, the application 
of the noneconomic damages cap statute has become a battle of the 
experts, with determinations of applicability hinging on opinions like 
111. See Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 165, 692 A.2d 5, 20-21 
(1997); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text. The court of special ap-
peals recently reaffirmed the Grimshaw test in Ford Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md. 
App. 1, 703 A.2d 1315 (1998). See supra note 108. 
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Porter Hayden Company, Anchor Packing v. 
Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 692 A.2d 5 (1997), cert. granted, Porter Hayden v. 
Bullinger, 346 Md. 373, 697 A.2d 112 (1997), Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
No. 56, September Term, 1997 (quoting testimony of Mr. Grimshaw's expert). 
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the above, which at times appear to be based on no more than the 
purest speculation. 113 However, evidence based on mere speculation 
will not support a claim for damages. 114 
Plaintiffs' experts have testified that the period of growth for a 
mesothelioma tumor-between inception and diagnosis-is likely to 
occur within ten years. 115 It would seem to follow that a diagnosis af-
ter 1996 would trigger application of the cap. Proponents of the 
Grimshaw test would assert, therefore, that the problems discussed 
herein will resolve in time. Recent testimony by a medical expert 
testifying for a plaintiff, however, illustrates that this may not be the 
case: 
Q. And, Doctor, with respect to the diagnosis in Janu-
ary of '97, do you have an opinion as to when [the plain-
tiff's] me~othelioma developed? .. . 
A. It's my understanding ... that he actually had chest 
pain as early as 1993. The type of mesothelioma he had was 
an epithelial type. I would say that it would be probably 
somewhere between 1980 and 1985 .... 
Q. Now I think you've testified in the past at least epi-
thelial mesotheliomas will develop within 10 years from the 
date of diagnosis? . . . 
A. I think what I've said is that they have started, at the 
latest, ten years before they are diagnosed clinically. . .. 
Q .... [H] ave you ever testified before, with respect to 
a time period of development, that that goes from the time 
of symptoms? 
A. I've never specifically, I don't think, said that, but if 
you look at how mesotheliomas are diagnosed and you look 
at various patients ... when they're evaluated, is that there 
are many cases where the mesothelioma is probably diag-
nosed sometimes as much as one to five years after the pa-
tient has developed a tumor. 116 
Thus, the question becomes: how far will experts go (and be al-
lowed to go) with their testimony in latent disease personal injury 
113. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
114. See Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 61-62, 344 A.2d 422, 427-28 (1975). 
115. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
116. In re Baltimore City Asbestos Litig., March 1998 Trial Cluster, Lead Case: Hin-
sen v. ACandS, Inc., No. 86CG1151/23/181 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City) (deposi-
tion of Samuel Hammar, M.D., February 20, 1998). 
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cases to avoid or to trigger the application of noneconomic 
damages cap statutes? 
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASE: THE FRYE-REED 
AND DAUBERT STANDARDS 
Under the Frye-Reed standard, which governs admissibility of sci-
entific evidence in Maryland, the evidence at issue must be shown 
to be generally accepted as reliable within the expert's particular 
scientific field.1I7 If a scientific technique's validity is in controversy 
in the relevant scientific field, or if it is regarded generally as an ex-
perimental technique, expert testimony dependent upon its validity 
cannot be admitted into evidence. liS 
It is undisputed that medical science has not yet advanced so as 
to enable doctors to determine the growth rate of a mesothelioma 
tumor. 1I9 Thus, there is no definitive test to determine when a 
117. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978). The Frye-Reed 
standard is a stricter ,standard than that applied by federal courts, as articu-
lated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, 
the Supreme Court concluded that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 superseded 
the Frye test, reasoning that the "rigid 'general acceptance' requirement [for 
admission of scientific evidence] would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of 
the Federal Rules" of Evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Air-
craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 159 (1988) (citing Rules 701 to 705». The cur-
rent inquiry under Rule 702 is whether the evidence in question is scientific 
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact, i.e., whether the evidence is both 
"reliable"-qualifies as scientific knowledge-and "relevant"-will assist the 
trier of fact. See id. at 589-92. Despite the fa~t that the current Maryland rules 
are derived from the federal rules, Maryland courts have chosen not to adopt 
the relaxed Daubert standard. See Keene Corp. v. Hall, 96 Md. App. 644, 626 
A.2d 997, cert. granted, 332 Md. 741 (1993); see also K. M. Carroll, Codifying the 
Rul£ on Expert Testimony: Why Traditional A nalysis Should be Generally Acceptabl£, 
54 MD. L. REv. 1085 (1995); JOSEPH F. MuRPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HAND-
BOOK § 1406A (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 1998). The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
has not explicitly decided whether the newly adopted Maryland Rules of Evi-
dence modify the Frye-Reed standard. See id. at 89 (Supp. 1998). On several oc-
casions, however, the court of appeals applied the Frye-Reed standard in cases 
decided after the new rules became effective. See id. 
118. See Schultz v. State, 106 Md. App. 145, 154, 664 A.2d 60, 64 (1995). See generally 
3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 353 
(2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1998) (comparing the "validity standard" adopted by 
the Court in Daubert with the Frye-Reed standard). 
119. See Marc J. Straus, The Growth Characteristics of Lung Cancer and Its Application to 
Treatment Design, 1 SEMINARS ONCOLOGY 167 (1974). 
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mesothelioma tumor began to form.120 Yet, as illustrated below, such 
evidence is routinely admitted when courts are determining whether 
the noneconomic damages cap applies. 
In Sheppard v. ACandS, Inc.,121 an asbestos case tried in the Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore City in May 1997, the plaintiffs' expert tes-
tified as follows on direct examination: 
Q. Doctor, with respect to the cancers caused by asbes-
tos exposure, do you have an opinion within reasonable 
medical certainty as to when those tumors began? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that opinion? 
A. With respect to mesothelioma, I think there is good 
evidence in the medical literature to suggest that those can-
cers begin at least ten years before they are diagnosed clini-
cally .... 
Q. Now, you said there is some good evidence in the 
literature. 
Does this have to do with the idea of doubling times? 
A. It does. 
[Extended explanation of various studies involving 
doubling times-mathematical formulas for measuring the 
rate of growth of certain cancers] 
Q. Doctor, the concepts about doubling time and how 
cancers grow that you have discussed with the jury here to-
day, are those concepts that are generally accepted in the 
medical literature? 
A. Yes. 122 
The following testimony was elicited on cross-examination. 
Q. Now, you told us that you had ... a pretty thick file 
of articles that dealt with doubling, tumor doubling or tu-
mor growth? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If I did pick up your file, there would only be one 
article in that file that would deal specifically with the issue 
120. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. 
121. No. 97121701 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City). 
122. Official Trial Transcript at T.161O, T.1660-61, Sheppard v. ACandS, Inc., No. 
9712701 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City) (testimony of Dr. Hammar). See the Appen-
dix to this Article for an extended excerpt. 
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of doubling or growth, tumor growth for mesotheliomas, 
am I correct? 
A. Only one that I know about. . . . 
Q. You yourself have expressed that opmlOn under 
oath that this very article, the only article dealing with 
doubling time for mesotheliomas, in fact, in your opinion is 
not reliable? 
A. Well, I - I don't know exactly how I said it. I would 
say that when you only have one article that talks about a 
subject like that, you can't absolutely be certain that that is 
what is going to come out to be the absolute way the data 
IS .••• 
Q. For that reason, you do not think there is any abso-
lute experimental data, either clinical or experimental for 
that matter, that will tell us exactly what the doubling time 
is for mesothelioma? 
A. Correct. I think I answered that, too. . .. 
Q. Now, at the close of your direct examination, Doc-
tor, you were asked a question about when a specific - a 
mesothelioma began in a specific individual. . . . 
Q. Let me take you back to your deposition in the 
Walatka matter . . . . 
Quote, "QUESTION: SO, Doctor, if I were to put the 
question to you, do you have an opinion to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty concerning how long before 
June of 1995, Mr. Walatka had a malignant mesothelioma, 
would you be able to answer that question? 
"ANSWER: I wouldn't be able to answer in a scientific 
manner, or a manner based on scientific fact. All I could 
basically do would be to tell you what I just told you." . . . 
"QUESTION: SO to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, you could not answer that question? 
"ANSWER: That is probably correct. I really couldn't. I 
don't think anybody can answer that question."123 
339 
As the above testimony illustrates, an adequate test has not 
been developed to measure the growth rate of a mesothelioma tu-
mor.124 Nonetheless, as the above excerpts illustrate, the dearth of 
123. See id. at T.161O. See the Appendix to this Article for an extended excerpt. 
124. Published studies on doubling time have measured cancers other than 
mesothelioma. Doubling time differs dramatically depending on the cell type 
of the tumor. See Strauss, supra note 119, at 169. Even within the same cell 
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scholarship and the lack of an adequate formula has not stopped 
plaintiffs' experts from opining as to the inception of the disease in 
the various plaintiffs, and from basing their conclusions about the 
date of inception of mesothelioma upon the doubling test. 125 Based 
upon the above testimony, not only does the doubling method test 
fail to meet Maryland's standard that the test be generally accepted 
within the relevant scientific community, but it does not even meet 
the more relaxed standard adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Daubert. 126 
Under Daubert, the evidence in question must be reliable and 
relevant. 127 In order to be reliable, the evidence must qualify as "sci-
entific knowledge." 128 The Court, in Daubert, defined scientific as 
having a "grounding in the methods and procedures of science,"129 
and knowledge as "more than subjective belief or unsupported 
speculation."13o Guidelines for determining whether evidence quali-
fies as scientific knowledge include: whether the theory or tech-
nique can or has been tested; whether it has been subject to peer 
review and publication; the known or potential rate of error; stan-
dards for controlling the technique's operation; and general accept-
ance within the scientific community. 131 
Based on the above testimony, it is clear that the doubling 
method does not meet the reliability prong of the Daubert test when 
applied to mesothelioma cases. Plaintiffs' experts acknowledge that 
the scholarship on the test's application to mesothelioma is ex-
tremely limited, and its reliability has been questioned generally in 
the medical community.132 Its application to mesothelioma cases is 
admittedly uncertain and unsupported by any reliable data. 133 Ac-
cordingly, it does not meet the requirement of reliability as set 
forth in Daubert. 
type, the range of doubling time is broad. See id. at 168-69. 
125. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. 
126. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. 
127. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); see also 4 
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, 
§ 702.05 Uoseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 1998) (discussing Daubert). 
128. Daubert, 509 u.s. at 589-90 (citing FED. R EVID. 702 and explaining that the 
rule applies to technical or specialized knowledge as well). 
129. Id. at 590. 
130. Id. 
13l. See id. at 593-94; see also WEINSfEIN & BERGER, supra note 127, § 702.05 (discuss-
ing the four Daubert guidelines). 
132. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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In addition, the doubling method fails to meet the second 
prong of the Daubert test because it is not relevant. A conclusion 
based on application of the doubling method cannot assist the trier 
of fact in determining the inception of a mesothelioma tumor be-
cause it is not based on scientific knowledge with regard to measur-
ing mesothelioma tumor growth. 134 Moreover, the development of a 
test which might meet the reliability and relevancy requirements 
does not appear to be imminent. 135 
Under the Armstrong and Grimshaw tests, much of the evidence 
on when the inhalation of asbestos causes a legally compensable 
harm involves speculative and medically unsupported expert testi-
mony.136 In both Armstrong and Grimshaw, the courts were called 
upon merely to decide whether the medical evidence was sufficient 
to conclude that the injury occurred prior to the effective date of 
the noneconomic damages cap statute. It is inevitable, however, that 
the Maryland appellate courts will ultimately have to address the is-
sue of admissibility of this expert testimony in future cases when the 
trier of fact is called upon to determine when an asbestos-related 
disease first occurred. The cap applicability test established by the 
Maryland courts in Armstrong and Grimshaw, at least in its applica-
tion to mesothelioma cases, relies upon the establishment of facts 
which arguably cannot currently be supported scientifically in a 
manner which meets the admissibility requirements of Maryland 
law.I37 
In rejecting plaintiffs' claims that an asbestos-related injury oc-
curs, for purposes of the cap statute, upon exposure to asbestos, 
and defendants' assertions that the injury occurs when the plaintiff 
experiences symptoms of the disease, the Grimshaw court established 
a functional impairment test for which there seems to be no objective 
measure.138 By requiring a finding as to the onset of a disease, 
134. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
136. See, e.g., Official Trial Transcript at T.161O, T.1660-61, Sheppard v. ACandS, 
Inc., No. 9712701 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City) (testimony of Dr. Hammar); see also 
supra notes 113-43 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
138. See Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 158-60, 692 A.2d 5, 17-
18 (1997). The lengthy latency period renders efforts to pinpoint the date on 
which the disease was contracted virtually impossible, medically and legally. See 
Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1133 (5th Cir. 1981). Plain-
tiffs, of course, would still argue that the development of the disease and the 
commencement of a plaintiff's functional impairment occurs upon first expo-
sure. Defendants would still maintain that such impairment cannot conceiva-
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which experts have testified occurs years before the first symptom, 
the test requires a factual determination ~s to the first manifestation 
of undetectable, asymptomatic, subclinical, cellular change. 139 There 
appears to be no scientific test, nor does one appear to be immi-
nently available, to make such a determination. 14o Thus, as long as 
Grimshaw remains the law in Maryland with regard to determining 
the applicability of the cap statute, evidentiary issues and problems 
of proof will persist. Moreover, .other states using a test similar to 
the Maryland test will face the same evidentiary issues, whether they 
apply a Frey-Reed or Daubert standard of admissibility.141 
IV. THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
Predictably, the evidentiary problems associated with the cap 
applicability issue have wrought a threshold issue: Who bears the 
burden of proof as to the applicability of the cap statute?142 Does 
the defendant bear the burden of showing that the relevant injury 
occurred after the effective date of the cap statute, or is it the plain-
tiff's burden to show that the injury occurred prior to that date? 
Generally, plaintiffs claim that a defendant bears the burden of 
proof on the applicability of the cap statute for the following 
reasons. 143 
1. When a defendant seeks to take advantage of a rule 
requiring a reduction in the amount of damages claimed by 
a plaintiff, the defendant has the burden of proving that 
rule's applicability.l44 
2. Plaintiffs asserting negligence and strict liability theo-
ries of recovery need only show that they suffered harm as 
a result of the defendant's conduct. A defendant's reliance 
on the cap statute to limit plaintiff's damages constitutes a 
defense, avoidance or limitation on recovery, that must be 
affirmatively proven by defendants. 145 
bly occur until the onset of the first symptom. 
139. See Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 161, 692 A.2d at 18; see also supra notes 122-23 
and accompanying text. 
140. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
142. See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text. 
143. See, e.g., In re Baltimore City Personal Asbestos Litig., No. 97027701, slip op. at 
5 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City, Sept. 9, 1997). 
144. See id. 
145. See id. 
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3. Defendants seek to apply the cap statute in deroga-
tion of plaintiffs' common law right to obtain damages 
deemed appropriate by the trier of fact; thus they must 
prove its applicability. 
343 
Defendants, on the other hand, assert that plaintiffs bear the 
burden of proof for the following reasons: 146 . 
1. Assigning the burden of proof to a defendant would 
create a presumption that the statute does not apply, and a 
presumption against applicability is contrary to the remedial 
purpose of the statute. The mandatory language of the stat-
ute establishes a presumption of its applicability.147 
2. Where suit is filed and the evidence of first compen-
sable harm occurs after July 1, 1986, the statute presump-
tively applies, and the person claiming inapplicability bears 
the burden of proving avoidance of the statute. 148 
3. The legislature did not make the cap an affirmative 
defense. 
4. Maryland asbestos casesl49 that have applied the cap 
have all implicitly placed the burden on the plaintiff. 150 
146. See id.; see also Reply Briefs of Appellants Owens Corning and Porter Hayden 
Co., at 1-7 ACandS, Inc. v. Brannan, (97-190) (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 10, 
1998). 
147. See In re Baltimore City Personal Asbestos Litig., No. 97027701, slip op. at 5 
(Cir. Ct. Baltimore City, Sept. 9, 1997). 
148. See id. 
149. See supra note 12. 
150. See Brown v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995); Chustz v. 
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 961 F. Supp. 143 (M.D. La. 1996) (affirming and 
granting, respectively, summary judgment motions of defendants based on 
plaintiffs' failure to produce evidence that their causes of action accrued-
that they suffered damages or bodily injury-before the effective date of the 
Louisiana Product Liability Act). 
Baltimore City Circuit Court Judge Richard Rombro recently held, that 
defendants bear the burden of proof as to applicability of the cap statute. See 
Mem. Op. and Order, Walatka v. ACandS, Inc., No. 9234501, (Cir. Ct. Balti-
more City, Sept. 9, 1997). The court maintained that the burden of proof is 
on the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue, and that burden never 
shifts. See id. at 6. The court further maintained. that a defendant has the bur-
den of proving matters of reduction and mitigation of plaintiff's damages, and 
since the defendants sought the cap's benefit in order to reduce the verdict, 
they bore the burden of proving its applicability. See id. The court found that 
because the defendants presented no evidence that the plaintiff's functional 
impairment developed after July 1, 1986, they failed to carry their burden of 
proof as to the cap's applicability. See id. at 8. 
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In Porter Hayden Co. v. Brannan, 151 the first Maryland appellate 
opinion to expressly address the burden of proof issue in the con-
text of applying the noneconomic damages cap, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland held that defendants bear the burden of 
proof. 152 The court observed that" [t] he matter was simply of no sig-
nificance until after the jury returned its verdict," and, thus, it re-
jected the defendants' contentions that the plaintiffs had the bur-
den of producing evidence during trial to establish that the cap was 
inapplicable. 153 The Brannan court noted that when the verdicts 
were rendered, the defendants moved to reduce the amounts of the 
awards in conformance with the statute. 154 The court observed that 
" [0] rdinarily, the moving party bears the burden of establishing 
that his or her motion should be granted," and concluded that it 
could "perceive no reason to depart from the general rule in the 
instant case."155 The court held that "none of the evidence ... es-
tablished precisely when the plaintiffs developed their mesothe-
liomas,"156 and, therefore, the defendants failed to shoulder their 
burden. 157 
The court's ruling highlights a practical problem with assigning 
the burden of proof to a defendant. Assigning the burden to a 
defendant places the defendant in the position of denying that the 
plaintiff has developed the disease and then having to offer expert 
proof that the plaintiff developed the disease between 1986 and the 
time of trial. Traditionally, defendants have been required to plead 
in the alternative. For example, with regard to the defense of con-
tributory negligence, a defendant maintains that it was not negli-
gent, but assuming it was, plaintiff was also negligent in such a way 
as to contribute to the accident. 158 Here, however, the defendant is 
forced to present scientific evidence that directly contradicts its as-
sertion as to plaintiff's lack of injury. It is fundamentally distinct 
from a traditional plea in the alternative because in the traditional 
scenario, the defendant is not forced to prove an element of the 
plaintiff's case in order to prevail on the issue. As a practical matter, 
151. No. 190 slip op. (Md. Ct. Spec. App., Mar. 10, 1998). 
152. See id. 
153. Id: at 40. 
154. See id. at 40-41. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 42. 
157. See id. 
158. See, e.g., Azar v. Adams, 117 Md. App. 426, 700 A.2d 821 (1997). 
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therefore, it may be unfair to assign this burden to a defendant. 159 
This ruling adds to the uncertainty and highlights the un-
workability of the current test for determining whether to apply the 
noneconomic damages cap. While the Maryland appellate courts 
have acknowledged the difficulty in determining when a cause of 
action arises,16O and doctors have acknowledged that a precise deter-
mination is impossible given the current medical science,161 the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland seemingly suggests in Brannan 
that defendants must establish "precisely when the plaintiffs devel-
oped their mesotheliomas."162 As plaintiff's experts have acknowl-
edged, determining the exact date of harm is impossible. 163 Thus, it 
is inconceivable that Maryland courts would require defendants to 
overcome this insurmountable hurdle. The Brannan court's ruling 
compounds the confusion surrounding the application of the 
noneconomic damages cap in latent disease cases in Maryland. 
V. LOSS OF CONSORTIUM 
The effect of a cap on noneconomic damages on loss of con-
sortium claims is another issue currently being litigated in Mary-
land. l64 Maryland courts have held that a loss of consortium claim is 
derivative of the injured spouse's personal injury claim, and, there-
fore, a single cap applies to the entire action. 165 
In Grimshaw, the trial court refused to apply the noneconomic 
damages cap to reduce the three plaintiffs' one million dollar loss 
of consortium awards. l66 The court of special appeals affirmed the 
trial court's ruling, reasoning that the plaintiffs suffered personal in-
jury when they developed mesothelioma. 167 Thus, the cause of ac-
tion in each case arose prior to the effective date of the statute, not-
159. See id. 
160. See Owen-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 122-23, 604 A.2d 47, 54-55 
(1992). 
161. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. 
162. See Brannan, slip op. at 42. 
163. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. 
164. See generally supra notes 12, 105-06 and accompanying text. 
165. See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 38, 660 A.2d 423,430 (1995); Mary H. Keyes, 
Survey, Loss of Consortium and the Cap on Noneconomic Damages, 55 Md. L. Rev. 
819, 832 (1996) (concluding that the Connors court accurately carried out the 
intent of the legislature by applying the noneconomic damages cap to the ag-
gregate award). 
166. See Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 166, 692 A.2d 5, 21 
(1997). 
167. See id. 
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withstanding the fact that some of the harm suffered-loss of 
consortium-occurred after that date. 168 
Apparently, the Grimshaw court based its holding on the im-
plicit notion that loss of consortium damages constitute merely a 
part of the harm arising from the spouse's physical injuries; thus, 
for purposes of applying the cap statute, the physical injury consti-
tuted the only injury that was applicable to determining when the 
cause of action arose.169 
The court did not, however, explicitly address the question of 
whether, in determining the applicability of the cap statute, the in-
jury to the marital unit and the spouse's personal injury are one in-
jury or two separate injuries. Although a loss of consortium claim 
derives from the initial injury to the spouse, it clearly represents an 
injury separate from that suffered by the injured spouse. It is an in-
jury to the marital unit. 170 To conclude that loss of consortium is 
the same injury, in the sense that all the elements of a cause of ac-
tion for loss of consortium are present when the elements of the 
cause of action based on the personal injury claim are met, does 
not reflect factual reality. The loss of consortium-the "loss of soci-
ety, affection, assistance, and co~ugal fellowship"171-does not oc-
cur when the first cancer cell forms in the injured spouse's body, 
even though that cancer may be the injury that results in the ulti-
mate death. Generally, a plaintiff's loss of consortium would not oc-
cur until well after the spouse's first symptom, when the injury pre-
vents the spouse from doing what he or she used to be able to do, 
168. The Grimshaw court stated: 
In the case at bar, each plaintiff exposed to asbestos suffered per-
sonal injury when he or she developed mesothelioma, which was 
prior to 1986. It is true, however, that some of the harm plaintiffs 
suffered as a result of those personal injuries, i.e., loss of consortium, 
did not occur until after the effective date of the statute .... Al-
though plaintiffs cont~nued to suffer damages, as a result of their 
personal injuries, after the effective date of the statute ... the cause 
of action arose prior to the effective date. 
[d.; see also Porter Hayden Co. v. Brannan, No. 190, slip op. at 38 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App., Mar. 10, 1998) ("We ... explained in Grimshaw that, because a loss 
of consortium claim is derivative of a claim for personal injury, the cause of 
action for loss of consortium is deemed to have arisen when the cause of ac-
tion for personal injury arose, even if the hann actually occurred later."). 
169. See Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 166-67, 692 A.2d at 21. 
170. See Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 115, 231 A.2d 514, 525 (1967). 
171. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 33-34, 660 A.2d 423, 428 (1995). 
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thus, adversely affecting the marital relationship.172 Analogous to a 
loss of consortium claim is a cause of action for wrongful death, 
which arises upon the death of the injured spouse, and not when 
the first cancerous cell forms in the spouse's body.173 It would be 
logical to conclude, therefore, that a cause of action for loss of con-
sortium can only arise when the marital unit experiences some 
injury. 
172. See id. 
173. See generally Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 447 A.2d 860 (1982). In OxtolJy, 
the court interpreted the effective date clause of the Health Care Malpractice 
Claims Act, which provided that the Act would apply only to medical injuries 
occurring on or after July 1, 1976. See id. at 85, 447 A.2d at 862. The question 
presented to the court was whether medical injury occurred when the mal-
practice occurred or when a resulting harm or damage occurred. The court 
concluded that medical injuries referred to "legally cognizable wrongs or dam-
age arising or resulting from the rendering or failure to render health care." 
[d. at 94, 447 A.2d at 866. The court considered whether all claims arising out 
of the injury to the patient would be treated as a unit for purposes of the stat-
ute's applicability where the initial physical injury occurred before, but some 
of the claims arose after, the effective date. See id. at 95, 447 A.2d at 866-67. 
The court considered situations in which a physical injury occurring before 
the effective date resulted in continued damage to the patient after the effec-
tive date. See id. at 96-97, 447 A.2d at 867-68. The court concluded that a medi-
cal injury would have been deemed to have occurred prior to the Act's effec-
tive date, even though all of the resulting damage to the patient had not been 
suffered prior to that date. See id. at 97, 447 A.2d at 868. Moreover, the court 
concluded that a wrongful death claim, which asserted a separate cause of ac-
tion, should not be treated as a claim for a separate medical injury, but 
should be brought under the umbrella of the medical injury which constituted 
the physical harm which was the basis of the survival action. See id. at 95, 99, 
447 A.2d at 866-67, 869. The court concluded that based on the statute's pur-
pose to reduce costs of handling claims, and because the statute provided a 
new procedure governing litigation of medical malpractice actions, whereby 
claims arising out of injuries after the effective date would be subject to arbi-
tration, and those before would not, the legislature intended that all claims 
arising out of one injury be litigated together. See id. at 97-98, 447 A.2d at 868. 
Accordingly, it held that where a medical injury occurred before the effective 
date, wrongful death actions based on that patient's death were not subject to 
the Act, regardless of when the death occurred. See id. at 99, 447 A.2d at 869. 
By contrast, application of the noneconomic damages cap to a loss of consor-
tium claim in a case in which the cap does not apply to the underlying claim 
for injury does not create the procedural problems involved in OxtolJy. Moreo-
ver, it is clear that, for purposes of cap applicability, the cap will apply to the 
wrongful death action although the injury occurred prior to the applicable 
date of the statute. See Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 153, 692 A.2d at 14. 
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The problem inherent in the Grimshaw court's holding be-
comes clear when one contemplates the following situation. A 
worker is exposed to asbestos between 1955 and 1978. He marries in 
1990. He experiences his first symptoms in 1994, becomes ill, and 
dies the same year. Mter his death, his estate and his widow bring 
survival and wrongful death actions against various asbestos manu-
facturers. The court finds that his injury developed before 1986, his 
cause of action therefore arose before 1986, and accordingly, the 
limitation on noneconomic damages is inapplicable. The court fur-
ther concludes that, under Grimshaw, the widow's cause of action 
for loss of consortium arose before 1986, even though the couple 
did not marry until 1990, and he did not experience any symptoms 
until 1994. 
Applying the Grimshaw test to the hypothetical loss of consor-
tium claim highlights the test's illogical premise and inherent un-
workability. As noted above, applying the Grimshaw Court's analysis 
of the cap statute in the context of a personal injury claim demon-
strates that in many cases, a cause of action may arise years before a 
single item of damages has been incurred.174 Likewise, in the con-
text of a loss of consortium claim, under the Grimshaw interpreta-
tion, a cause of action may be deemed to have arisen years before 
the first injury to the relationship.175 In some cases, the cause of ac-
tion for loss of consortium could be deemed to have occurred even 
before the marriage took place. 176 
VI. CALIFORNIA - BVTFRAM v. OWENS-CORNING 
California, the only other state that has addressed some of the 
above issues in the context of a statute limiting noneconomic dam-
ages,177 has chosen a direction that avoids the problems discussed 
174. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
175. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
176. But see Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y 
1995) (finding that because tortious injury occurred upon plaintiff's inhalation 
of asbestos fibers, which occurred prior to his marriage, the wife could not re-
cover loss of consortium damages even though husband's mesothelioma devel-
oped sixteen years after the marriage). The Consorti court made no distinction 
between the i~ury to the husband and the injury to the marital unit. In a 
later case, the Court of Appeals of New York recognized that its bright line ex-
posure rule was abrogated by statute, specifically N.Y C.P.L.R. 214-<: (McKinney 
1986), which provided for a discovery rule in toxic tort cases. See Blanco v. 
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 689 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y 1997). 
177. See Buttram v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 941 P.2d 71 (Cal. 1997). 
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above. 178 The Court of Appeals of Maryland should adopt a similar 
interpretation if and when it does accept this issue for review. 179 
In August, the Supreme Court of California decided Buttram v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,180 which addressed the issue of when a 
cause of action accrues for purposes· of applying California's 
noneconomic damages cap to damages from a latent disease, such 
as asbestos-related pleural mesothelioma. The Buttram court held 
that the cause of action accrues when either the disease was diag-
nosed or when the plaintiff otherwise discovered the illness or inju-
ries, whichever occurs first. 181 In doing so, the California court re-
jected as unworkable a test similar to the Grimshaw test. 182 
The Fair Responsibility Act,183 popularly known as Proposition 
51,184 is California's statutory limitation on damages. 185 Proposition 
178. See id. 
179. See Shepardson, supra note 19, at 474-75 (comparing Maryland's approach in 
Armstrong II with California's approach in Buttram). As one commentator con-
cluded, the Buttram court's approach "strikes the proper balance between con-
sideration of a party's settled expectation of the law, accrual of rights, and im-
plementation of new legislation." [d. at 478. 
180. See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 7l. 
18l. See id. at 83; see also Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 562 A.2d llO0 
(Conn. 1989) (holding that the cause of action accrued, for purposes of appli-
cability of product liability statute, when plaintiff suffered actionable harm-
when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered that he had been injured 
and that defendant's conduct caused such i~ury); Shepardson, supra note 19, 
at 460 (explaining that the proper accrual date was held to be "the date of 
the plaintiff's diagnosis or diagnosibility"). 
182. See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 82. 
183. See CAuF. CIY. CODE, §§ 1431-143l.5. (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). 
184. See Shepardson, supra note 19, at 459. 
185. See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 75. The Act begins with the following statement of 
Findings and Declaration of Purpose: 
The legal doctrine of joint and several liability, also known as the 
'deep pocket rule,' has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice 
that has threatened financial bankruptcy of local governments, other 
public agencies, private individuals and businesses and has resulted 
in higher prices for goods and services to the public and in higher 
taxes to the taxpayers. 
(b) ... Under joint and several liability, if [deep pocket defendants] 
are found to share even a fraction of the fault, they are often held fi-
nancially liable for all the damage. The People-taxpayers and con-
sumers alike-ultimately pay for these lawsuits in the form of higher 
taxes, higher prices and higher insurance premiums. 
(c) Local governments have been forced to curtail some essential po-
lice, fire and other protections because of soaring costs of lawsuits 
and insurance premiums. 
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51, which took effect June 4, 1986, modified significantly the com-
mon law rule of joint and several liability in situations involving 
comparative fault. 186 Under Proposition 51, multiple tortfeasors con-
tinue to be jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs' economic dam-
ages. 187 However, after Proposition 51, multiple tortfeasors are now 
liable only for the percentage of noneconomic damages that corre-
lates to their own percentage of fault. 188 
Proposition 51, codified in California's Fair Responsibility Act, 
provides: 
In any action for personal injury, property damage, or 
wrongful death, based upon principles of comparative fault, 
the liability of each defendant for non-economic damages 
shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each defendant 
shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic dam-
ages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that 
defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment 
§ 1431.1 (a)-( c). The measure declares that its purpose is to "remedy these in-
equities" by holding defendants "liable in closer proportion to their degree of 
fault," id. § 1431.1 (c), thus eliminating the "deep pocket rule" and the result-
ing injustice to certain defendants. See id. § 1431.1 (a); Buttram, 941 P.2d at 75. 
186. See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 75. 
187. See id. 
188. See id. As stated by the California court: 
Proposition 51 was designed to rectify the situation [that existed] 
under California's comparative fault tort law, whereby a defendant 
who bears only a small share of fault for an injury can be left with 
the obligation to pay all or a large share of the plaintiff's damages 
[when other more] culpable tortfeasors are insolvent. The drafters of 
Proposition 51 attempted to alleviate the perceived inequity arising 
from this situation. 'While recognizing the potential inequity in a 
rule which would require an injured plaintiff ... to bear the full 
brunt of the loss if one of a number of tortfeasors should prove in-
solvent, the drafters of the initiative at the same time concluded that 
it was unfair ... to require a tortfeasor who might only be minimally 
culpable to bear all of the plaintiff's damages. As a result, the draft-
ers crafted a compromise solution: Proposition 51 retains the tradi-
tional joint and several liability doctrine with respect to a plaintiff's 
economic damages, but adopts a rule of several liability for 
noneconomic damages, providing that each defendant is liable for 
only that portion of the plaintiff's noneconomic damages which is 
commensurate with that defendant's degree of fault for the injury. 
[d. at 75 (quoting Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, 590-91 (Cal. 
1988)). 
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shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount. 189 
Like Maryland's cap statute, Proposition 51 is prospective only 
in its application. 190 The California Supreme Court previously held 
that Proposition 51 does not apply to a cause of action that has "ac-
crued" before its effective date of June 4, 1986.191 
In Buttram, the California Supreme Court was called upon to 
determine when the plaintiff's cause of action for damages arising 
from mesothelioma accrued for the purpose of determining whether 
Proposition 51 was applicable to his case. 192 The court reviewed a 
court of appeal's decision affirming a trial court ruling that Proposi-
tion 51 did not apply to the plaintiff's case because the plaintiff's 
medical testimony had established that "undetected cancer cells in 
probability had started forming by 1984, two years prior to the effec-
tive date of Proposition 51,"193 and thus the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion for injuries arising from pleural mesothelioma had accrued 
before the effective date. 194 The court of appeal had reasoned that, 
for purposes of Proposition 51, plaintiff's cause of action accrued 
when "he suffered some sort of appreciable, meaning compensable, 
harm or injury."195 Under the court of appeal's test, "subclinical 
(i.e., undiscovered and unmanifested) cellular changes, such as de-
velopment of the first cancer cell, constitute [d] the 'appreciable 
harm' that triggers accrual of a cause of action for Proposition 51 
purposes in the latent disease context."196 
189. Cal. Civ. Code § 1431.2(a). The statute defines noneconomic damages as "sub-
jective, non-monetary losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, in-
convenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and compan-
ionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation." CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1431.2(b) (2). 
190. See Evangelatos, 753 P.2d at 598. 
191. See id. at 611. 
192. See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 73. 
193. Id. 
194. See id. 
195. Id. 
196. /d. The court of appeal articulated the test as follows: "[F] or purposes of de-
termining the applicability of Proposition 51, a cause of action accrues when 
the injury reaches the point that it is 'compensable,' i.e., when the plaintiff 
suffers such 'appreciable harm' that he would be entitled to commence an ac-
tion for damages." Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
703, 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 941 P.2d 71 (Cal. 1997). In applying the 
test, the court concluded that the plaintiff had suffered appreciable harm 
prior to the effective date of Proposition 51 where there was unrebutted testi-
mony that the plaintiff "probably had cancer cells seven years before the 1991 
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The Supreme Court of California noted that there were a num-
ber of possible triggering events that might establish the accrual 
date of a cause of action for personal injuries arising from a latent 
disease. 197 The possible triggering events included medically signifi-
cant events such as exposure to the substance, subclinical changes, 
the appearance of symptoms, diagnosis, or legally significant events 
such as actual or constructive knowledge of the development of the 
disease. 198 
The court observed, however, that a cause of action may be 
viewed as accruing for different purposes on different dates; in the 
context of third-party liability insurance coverage, courts have in-
voked an early accrual date; and in a statute of limitations analysis, 
courts have applied a later accrual date, consistent with the policy 
considerations underlying each determination. 199 The court ob-
served that one consideration that it took into account in determin-
ing that Proposition 51 was only to be applied prospectively was that 
applying it retroactively could have unfair consequences on parties 
who had acted in reasonable reliance on pre-Proposition 51 law.20o 
However, in the context of determining the appropriate accrual 
discovery of fluid in his lungs." [d. at 707; see also Peterson v. Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corp., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("We hold that, 
for purposes of Proposition 51, an action accrues when the plaintiff undergoes 
a physiological change that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
caused the condition giving rise to the claim."), overruled by Buttram v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 941 P.2d 71 (Cal. 1997); Coughlin v. Owens-Illinois, 
Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("[TJhe key inquiry is: 
When did plaintiff suffer sufficient injury such that, had he been aware of it, 
he could have established a cause of action?"), overruled by Buttram, 941 P.2d 
71. 
197. See Buttram, 941 P.2d at 76-77. Specifically, the court stated: 
[d. 
Analytically, one could posit a continuum of triggering events which, 
from a medical or legal standpoint, might be used to establish the 
date on which a cause of action for personal injuries arising from a 
latent disease has "accrued," beginning with initial exposure to the 
toxic substance and proceeding through the inception of undetected 
physical changes (i.e., "subclinical" or "cellular" changes), the first 
appearance of symptoms, medical diagnosis (which may come before 
or after the onset of symptomatology), and the occurrence of certain 
legally significant events (i.e., actual or constructive knowledge of the 
onset of disease). 
198. See id. 
199. See id. at 77. 
200. See id. at 79-80. 
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date of a cause of action for latent disease, the reasonable reliance 
consideration did not exist, because prior to discovery or diagnosis, 
the plaintiff has no awareness of his injury or of the possibility of a 
need to file suit in the future. 201 
. The Supreme Court of California observed that the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland's opinion in Armstrong II "gives no considera-
tion whatsoever to the analogous policy considerations and pur-
poses to be served in adopting an accrual rule that determines the 
applicability of a tort reform statute such as Proposition 51. "202 The 
Buttram court added: "We cannot agree that subclinical alteration of 
the cells during the decades-long latency period of asbestos-related 
disease, determined only in retrospect through medical testimony, 
without manifestation of any symptoms or awareness of illness on 
the plaintiff's part, should be the event establishing accrual .... "203 
The California court noted that under the appreciable harm 
test, an asbestos plaintiff who had suffered no impairment or dam-
ages as of the effective date of Proposition 51, but whose medical 
experts later convinced a jury that he had developed cellular 
changes decades earlier, could have his suit governed by tort law 
that was abrogated more than a decade earlier.204 The court there-
201. See id. at 80. The court stated: 
Id. 
Until the plaintiff's injury is first diagnosed or discovered by the 
plaintiff, he has no awareness of his disease or injuries, or of the pos-
sibility of a future need to file suit, much less any expectation of re-
covery. If diagnosis, or the plaintiff's discovery of his latent injuries, 
does not occur until after June 4, 1986, the effective date of Proposi-
tion 51, then neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has had anyoc-
casion to calculate potential liability under the former rule of un-
restricted joint and several liability .... Moreover, until there has 
been actual harm or injury and an awareness of same, there can be 
no noneconomic damages to be pled .... In short, none of the con-
siderations that militated against declaring Proposition 51 retroactive 
... would be undermined by a rule that looks to diagnosis or discov-
ery of actual injury as the date on which a cause of action should be 
deemed to accrue for the limited purpose of determining whether 
Proposition 51's tort reform measures can be fairly and prospectively 
applied in a latent injury case. 
202. Id. at 82. 
203. Id. 
204. The court observed: 
Under the ["appreciable harm" test] the lawsuits of any presently 
identified or future asbestos plaintiff, who, as of Proposition 51's ef-
fective date of June 4, 1986, had no actual physical impairment or 
354 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 27 
fore rejected a test "dependent on medical testimony that seeks to 
retrospectively determine the point at which asymptomatic unde-
tected cellular changes in probability first altered the plaintiff's 
physiology years or decades earlier,''205 and instead adopted the "di-
agnosis or discovery" test to determine applicability of the limitation 
on noneconomic damages.206 
In rejecting the Court of Appeals of Maryland's reasoning in 
Armstrong II, the Supreme Court of California noted that the Mary-
land court's holding in Armstrong II appeared to have been based, to 
a large extent, on the express meaning of the word arises.207 It ob-
served that the California statute had no similar controlling 
language.208 . 
Arguably, the use of the word arises, rather than accrnes, in Ma-
ryland's noneconomic damages cap statute supports the argument 
that it would not be appropriate to make discovery or diagnosis the 
trigger for determining the applicable date when determining 
whether the claim is governed by the cap. However, that is not nec-
essarily so. The Court of Appeals of Maryland defined arises as 
"comes into existence''209 and concluded that a cause of action 
arises when facts supporting all of its elements have come into exis-
symptoms of any asbestos-related disease and who had yet to suffer 
any noneconomic damages or harbor any awareness that he would in . 
the future suffer from such a disease and ultimately bring suit against 
asbestos defendants-but whose medical experts later convince a jury 
in retrospect that in probability formation of asymptomatic and un-
detected cellular changes had commenced decades earlier-would be 
governed by tort laws overwhelmingly abrogated by the electorate 
over a decade ago. Indeed, given the decades-long latency periods of 
asbestos-related disease, it is not unrealistic to conclude that under 
the accrual test adopted by the Court of Appeal, the now disfavored 
joint and several liability rule would still have to be applied in asbes-
tos-related latent injury litigation well into the 21st century. 
[d. at 83. 
205. [d. at 80 n.5. 
206. See id. at 80. However, the court did not consider the question of when a 
cause of action for loss of consortium would accrue, nor did it specifically ad-
dress the issue of which party bears the burden of proof with regard to ac-
crual for purposes of applicability of the statute. 
207. See id. at 81. 
208. See id. 
209. Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 121, 604 A.2d 47, 54 (1992); see 
Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 155, 692 A.2d 5, 16 
(1997) . 
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tence.210 The court of appeals stated that the fact of injury was gen-
erally the last to come into existence, and therefore, a cause of ac-
tion arose when the injury came into existence.211 
The Armstrong II court then assumed that the injury would have 
to occur before diagnosis or discovery.212 It would be equally consis-
tent with the language of the statute, however, to conclude that the 
injury occurred, and thus the cause of action arose, upon diagnosis 
or discovery, whichever occurred earlier. This is consistent with the 
requirement that the plaintiff incur some objectively verifiable func-
tional impairment in order to have a legally compensable injury.213 
It is only after the plaintiff has been diagnosed or has experienced 
symptoms of disease that the plaintiff incurs such legally compensa-
ble damages as lost wages and pain and suffering.214 Thus, a diagno-
sis or discovery test would be consistent with the language of Mary-
land's noneconomic damages cap statute. 
A diagnosis or discovery test would be both simpler to apply and 
more consistent with the policy considerations underlying the stat-
ute. The Maryland courts' mechanical application of the language 
of the statute gives no consideration either to the policy considera-
tions or to the practical considerations associated with applying the 
statute. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not yet expressed a will-
ingness to address the issue of the applicability of the statutory cap 
on noneconomic damages.215 The court should grant certiorari on 
this issue in a future case in order to clarifY the law, remedy the 
problems of proof discussed above, and ensure that the statute is 
applied in a manner which more fully effectuates its intent. 
The court should clarifY its holding in Armstrong II, that a cause 
of action arises for purposes of the cap statute "when facts exist to 
support each element, "216 of the cause of action, with the fact of in-
jury being the last element to come into existence, by defining the 
injury element as requiring legally compensable harm that would 
210. See Armstrong II, 326 Md. at 121, 604 A.2d at 54. 
211. See id. 
212. See id. at 121, 604 A.2d at 54. 
213. See supra notes 91, 106, 108, 138, 150 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 106-11. 
215. See supra note 103. 
216. Armstrong II, 326 Md. at 121, 604 A.2d at 54. 
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form a basis for recovery by a plain tiff. 217 The court should reaffirm 
the Armstrong I holding that mere alteration of the pleura-the thin 
membrane which lines the chest wall and diaphragm-does not 
constitute a legally compensable injury218 because it does not cause 
any loss or detriment.219 Further, the court should make clear that 
legally compensable injury occurs only when physical changes cause 
an objectively verifiable functional impairment, as expressed by the 
court of special appeals in Armstrong L220 Further, the court should 
make clear that functional impairment does not occur until a plain-
tiff has experienced symptoms of the disease which actually impair 
his physical functioning. 221 Finally, the court should make clear that, 
for the purpose of applying the cap statute, an injury does not oc-
cur until the plaintiff suffers damages which are legally compensa-
ble, such as medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, or loss 
of consortium.222 
The test adopted by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
in Grimshaw is based upon a "development of disease" analysis, for 
which there seems to be no objective measure. This test seems in-
consistent with settled principles of Maryland law requiring that, in 
order to state a tort cause of action, a plaintiff must incur legally 
compensable damages.223 
California's "discovery or diagnosis" test, adopted in Buttram, 
avoids the problems associated with the Grimshaw test. California's 
test provides a clear method for courts to determine when a cause 
of action arises for purposes of applying the limits provided by 
noneconomic damages cap statutes.224 Maryland and other states 
faced with these issues in asbestos or other latent disease cases can 
avoid the problems described above by adopting similar tests. 
217. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
220. See Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 87 Md. App. 699, 735, 591 A.2d 544, 561 
(1991) ("Mere exposure to asbestos and cellular changes resulting from asbes-
tos exposure, such as pleural plaques and thickening, alone is not a functional 
impairment or harm, and therefore, do not constitute a legally compensable 
injury."); see also supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra notes 71-77, 106-11 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra notes 160-63, 192-98, 202-14 and accompanying 
text. 
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APPENDIX 
Testimony of Medical Expert for Plaintiff in Sheppard v. ACandS, 
Case No. 97121701, Circuit Court for Baltimore City: 
Q. Doctor, with respect to the cancers caused by asbes-
tos exposure, do you have an opinion within reasonable 
medical certainty as to when those tumors began? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that opinion? 
A. With respect to mesothelioma, I think there is good 
evidence in the medical literature to suggest that those can-
cers begin at least ten years before they are diagnosed clini-
cally .... 
Q. Now, you said there is some good evidence in the 
literature. 
Does this have to do with the idea of doubling times? 
A. It does. 
[Extended explanation of various studies involving 
doubling times-mathematical formulas for measuring the 
rate of growth of certain cancers] 
Q. Doctor, the concepts about doubling time and how 
cancers grow that you have discussed with the jury here to-
day, are those concepts that are generally accepted in the 
medical literature? ... 
A. Yes. 
The following testimony was elicited on cross-
examination. 
Q. Now you told us that you had ... a pretty thick file 
of articles that dealt with doubling, tumor doubling or tu-
mor growth? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If I did pick up your file, there would only be one 
article in that file that would deal specifically with the issue 
of doubling or growth, tumor growth for mesotheliomas, 
am I correct? 
A. Only one that I know about. ... 
Q. Fair enough. And the only one, as you said, that you 
are aware of is the article by Dr. Greengard and others 
styled, Enzyme Pathology of Human Mesotheliomas, pub-
lished in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute in 
1986, correct? . . . 
Q. Now I don't think I heard this. 
358 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 27 
Did you tell the jury that there are a lot of folks in the 
medical and scientific community that have not found this 
study to be reliable in terms of doubling time or growth 
rate for mesotheliomas? 
A. I think there has always been a question about the 
thymidine kinase concept. 
And the issue has always arisen as how accurate that is 
with respect to whether or not it is as accurate as the doub-
ling times calculated by mathematical measurements of 
chance in the tumor over a period of time. . . . 
And that's probably going to exist until more data is 
given. But, you know, I think Greengard, at least in her ini-
tial article, indicated why she thought it was accurate. And 
she indicated in the second article on mesotheliomas what 
the values she obtained for the 16 cases that she examined. 
Q. You yourself have expressed that opinion under 
oath that this very article, the only article dealing with 
doubling time for mesotheliomas, in fact, in your opinion is 
not reliable? 
A. Well, I - I don't know exactly how I said it. I would 
say that when you only have one article that talks about a 
subject like that, you can't absolutely be certain that that is 
what is going to come out to be the absolute way the data 
is. 
But I would also say that that is the only thing that has 
been done. And based on Greengard's initial studies, there 
is reasons to believe that that data at least would indicate 
what the doubling times were for lung cancers, based on 
the data that she calculated. 
What she didn't do, and there is no way to do this, 
there is no way to do a mathematical calculation of doub-
ling times in mesothelioma. It is impossible. And the reason 
it is impossible is because of the way the tumor grows. 
So then you are always going to have to take this data 
that is attributable to some other type of tumor and see if 
you can apply it to mesothelioma. 
And I think I gave the reasons that I thought you 
could, in general, apply lung cancer doubling to mesothe-
lioma, based on the fact that the epithelial mesotheliomas 
have a lower S phase, and have a more normal DNA index 
than, say, pulmonary adenocarcinomas. 
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Q. In the Walatka deposition, you talked about that 
there was one study that had been done, but that you did 
not think it was that reliable of a study. 
"Is that the study that was done by, I guess, it was the 
pediatrician, Greengard." 
Your answer on March 4, 1997 was, "Yes." 
"QUESTION: Are there any other studies other than 
the Greengard study?" 
And your answer was, "No." ... 
Q. Now, ... would it be fair to state, contrasted with 
the issue of doubling time with lung cancer, very few peo-
ple have considered the issue of doubling time with 
mesothelioma? 
A. That's true. That's for the reasons I have already ex-
pressed. Namely, that it is a tumor that can't be measured 
by ordinary radiographic techniques. 
Q. For that reason, you do not think there is any abso-
lute experimental data, either clinical or experimental for 
that matter, that will tell us exactly what the doubling time 
is for mesothelioma? 
A. Correct. I think I answered that, too. 
Q. As of today, you have not done any [experimental 
work] that you have published in the medical literature; is 
that right? 
A. Not published in the medical literature, no. 
Q. And would you agree that, basically, your thought is, 
we know very little about how fast mesotheliomas grow? 
A. In general, that is correct. 
Q. Now, at the close of your direct examination, Doc-
tor, you were asked a question about when a specific - a 
mesothelioma began in a specific individual. 
Do you recall that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Now, you have been asked that question before, 
have you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me take you back to your deposition in the 
Walatka matter, which was referenced in the earlier ques-
tion and answer. . . . 
Q. And if I could direct you to page 50, Doctor, you 
were asked the following question. 
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Quote, "QUESTION: SO, Doctor, if I were to put the 
question to you, do you have an opinion to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty concerning how long before 
June of 1995, Mr. Walatka had a malignant mesothelioma, 
would you be able to answer that question? 
"ANSWER: I wouldn't be able to answer in a scientific 
manner, or a manner based on scientific fact. All I could 
basically do would be to tell you what I just told you." . . . 
"QUESTION: SO to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, you could not answer that question? 
"ANSWER: That is probably correct. I really couldn't. I 
don't think anybody can answer that question." 
Did I read that correcdy? 
A. You did. 
Q. And you subsequendy testified at the trial of that 
matter in Baltimore on February 3, 1997, did you not? ... 
Q. And referring now to page 1179, "QUESTION: You 
can't say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty 
how long before June of 1995, Mr. Walatka had a malignant 
mesothelioma? 
"ANSWER: Probably not within medical certainty. 
There has only actually been one study that had looked at 
how fast mesotheliomas grow and how - what their doub-
ling time is. And that study might not even be reliable, so I 
could not." 
Q. And then you were asked a follow-up question on 
page 1180, the next page, and you were asked this follow-up 
question. 
"Is it just not known at this point in time? 
"ANSWER: It is the type of tumor that might not be 
known for a long time until we get some better methods, 
because it doesn't grow as a spherical mass. It grows as a 
rind. And it is very hard to see the change in size over 
time, which is necessary to calculate how fast a tumor 
grows." 
Did I state your answer to that question correcdy? 
A. You did, yes. 
Q. And as you have told us a moment ago, there isn't 
anything new and starding in the medical literature which 
has appeared since your deposition in December of 1996, 
or your trial testimony in 1997 on the issue of doubling 
time and mesotheliomas; is that correct? 
1998] Limiting liability for Damages 361 
A. That is correct. 
Official Trial Transcript at T.1610, T.1660-61, T.1749-60, Sheppard v. 
ACandS, Inc., No. 97121701 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City) (testimony of 
Dr. Hammar). 

